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INTRODUCTION
Professor Susan Carle's contribution to this symposium, if I under-
stand it correctly, first reviews her published research on the ethical be-
havior of the early NAACP leaders.' The paper then reassesses that
research from the perspective of the several schools of thought on the
relationship between "class" interest and professional regulation. The
problem that animates Carle's paper is whether the elite lawyers who
populated the NAACP's board during its earliest decade used their posi-
tions to promote personal or class interests, instead of the interests of the
clients the NAACP served. That the lawyers were elites is evidenced by
their inclination to excuse themselves from adhering to certain ethical
prescriptions they had a hand in promulgating. Did these lawyers use,
albeit perhaps unconsciously, the NAACP, the guise of the public inter-
est, and their willingness to exempt themselves from ethical restrictions
to promote self-interested ends?
This question assumes that lawyers' self-interest and their inclina-
tion and ability to conduct "pro bono" public interest litigation are in
tension. In my view, they are not. Self-interest can, and arguably has,
produced pro bono activities that further the public interest. Instead of
calling lawyers away from self-interest to perform pro bono work, aca-
demic commentators interested in promoting pro bono efforts instead
should attempt to explain how the two can coexist.
I. PRO BONO AND SELF-INTEREST
The primary contribution of the economic analysis of law has been
descriptive. It has attempted to explain much of the common law as a
product of rational self-interest. This explanation of the law has com-
t Professor of Law, Willamette University. Mr. Robert Simon provided able research
assistance.
I Susan Carle, How Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking about Professional
Regulation?: The Early NAACP as a Case Example, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 571
(2003) [hereinafter Carle, Class Interests].
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monly caused confusion on the part of certain critics. Just because a
particular area of common law doctrine is consistent with rational self-
interest does not necessarily mean the relevant rule makers, such as com-
mon law judges, created that body of law in an explicit attempt to further
any particular aim. The actual motivations of the rule makers are techni-
cally irrelevant. What matters is that the rule makers' activities collec-
tively created a body of law that produced or promoted certain allocative
efficiencies, and that the law can to a certain extent be rationalized along
these lines, thus allowing for a more complete understanding of the rules
and more plausible predictions of the law's evolution.
Surprisingly, pro bono activities can also be explained as a function
of economic self-interest. One such pro bono story can be told with re-
spect to the ethical rules themselves. The rules of professional regulation
on the whole are clearly in the public interest. The rule against conflicts
of interest2 promotes unbiased, disinterested representation; the confi-
dentiality rules 3 protect client confidences and enhance the quality of
legal representation; the trust accounting rules 4 protect client assets; and
advertising and solicitation limitations 5 maintain client trust in the integ-
rity of the profession and minimize client vulnerability by warding off
overreaching by lawyers. Nevertheless, it is a fact that lawyers, who
might prefer to further their self-interest, helped devise these rules. As a
result, a self-interested interpretation of the rules is also plausible. The
rule against conflicts of interests deters lawyers from discounting their
services for antagonistic clients who wish to share a lawyer, and also
ensures the multiplication of lawyers to resolve disputes; the confidenti-
ality rules provide clients with a valuable place to hide their secrets and
obtain sophisticated advice an asset lawyer can uniquely offer to clients
for great remuneration; the trust accounting rules make clients pay full
freight for their lawyers, discouraging lawyers who would cheat the go-
ing rate by using client trust accounts as a source of borrowed funds; and
the advertising and solicitation limitations protect established client rela-
tionships, and provide a barrier to entry to new competitors. In short, the
rules can plausibly be understood to promote the collective or "class in-
terests" of lawyers by protecting fee levels against price cheaters and by
generating clients to pay those fees.
Which of these explanations of the rules of professional regulation
is the "correct" one? Why not both? Here's a better story: that lawyers,
acting consistently with their personal and collective self-interest, have
produced a body of rules that serve the public good. The rule against
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.9 (2002).
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2002).
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1-7.5 (2002).
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conflicted representations, for example, while promoting the multiplica-
tion of lawyers and discouraging price cheaters, also produces quality,
unbiased representations. The public benefits of such a rule might out-
weigh its marginal anti-competitive effects. The fact that lawyers who
justify this rule would point to its obvious public benefits does not auto-
matically mean that the rule does not create benefits for its apologists as
well. Most rules do create private rents and thus are sought by rent-
seekers. 6 To acknowledge this fact is not to argue that there should be no
rules at all. That rent-seekers seek rules that favor them is a given.
Whether or not rent-seekers can point to substantial public benefits or
positive externalities from the rule, sufficient in size to outweigh the non-
productive transfer payment of the rent, should operate as the litmus test
for the desirability of the rule.
II. THE NAACP'S PUBLIC INTEREST WORK
The assumption behind much of the "pro bono encouragement"
literature is to the contrary, arguing that lawyers' self-interest is in ten-
sion with public interest litigation and pro bono activities more generally.
The claim is that lawyers, who spend a large portion of their time in
profit-making activities, need to put aside crass, greedy self-interest and
exercise altruistic motives to accomplish public good. The data on the
NAACP's early years, however, suggests its lawyers acted in a manner
consistent with the "self-interest" of the group, and that the self-interest
of the NAACP produced desirable public goods. One way the NAACP
furthered its own cause was by competing against other lawyers who
were interested in remedying the plight of African-Americans. 7 The
NAACP also sought to maximize the value of its expenditures, preferring
cases that raised litigable issues that, if resolved favorably, would have
widespread impact.8 Many of these cases involved commercial rela-
6 See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT Ex-
TRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
7 The minutes of the NAACP National Legal Committee meeting in 1913 include dis-
cussion of an attempt to remove local representation from the case of Alabama & V.R. Co. v.
Morris, 234 U.S. 766 (1914), to allow for NAACP representation. The NAACP's minutes
from 1917 describe an accusation made against one Dr. Bundy to the effect that he was ille-
gally soliciting funds for his defense, a practice at which the NAACP was experienced; see
Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW &
HIST. REV. 97, 121-22 (2002) [hereinafter Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics]. The
NAACP's diligence in insinuating itself into controversies, even if limited to inexpensive let-
ter-writing, along with its public campaign for clients, funds, and test cases, evidence the
degree to which the organization struggled to become a significant voice for its cause. See
generally Carle, Class Interests, supra note 1.
8 The NAACP's strategy of devising test cases is documented in Carle, Race, Class, and
Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 100-03.
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tions.9 Indeed, because the group during this period was funded in part
by members of the wealthy business class,' 0 the NAACP's willingness to
litigate commercial cases had the effect of opening markets for business.
Discrimination is costly along many dimensions, including its tendency
to hinder business development.
Was the NAACP to be faulted if its first leaders were motivated by
interests other than an altruistic love of the public good and were in part
funded by businesses? In my view, the NAACP's competitiveness was
instrumental to its eventual success. Racial discrimination was en-
trenched and pervasive. It required a unified, cohesive, well-funded and
highly organized opposition to defeat it. The NAACP's empire building
created this necessary structure; part of the story of the NAACP's emer-
gence is that many competitor public interest groups and individual pub-
lic service providers left in its wake.'' Empire building may also have
necessitated its leaders ignoring or excusing themselves from the ethical
prohibitions that regulated the profession. The NAACP's competitive-
ness and willingness to engage in acts of solicitation brought it national
prominence, procured for it fund-raising advantages, and certainly as-
sured its members salaries, standing, and authority over the development
of new law. In my view, whether or not the NAACP's founders acted
out of self-interest is not an important question. What is important is to
observe that their actions, even if out of self-interest, generated substan-
tial public benefits that continue to accrue to this day. Even if the mo-
tives of the business class that funded part of the NAACP's litigations
were purely financial, the point is that pursuit of financial self-interest
helped produce substantial and overriding public benefits.
Pro bono can be a by-product of self-interest. At the time of the
NAACP's founding and for much of the history of the American bar, pro
9 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (local segregation ordinance
prohibiting blacks from living on the same block as whites); Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910 (Md.
1918) (residential segregation ordinance); State v. Jenkins, 92 A. 773 (Md. 1914) (segregated
seating on trains); State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546 (Md. 1913) (challenge to residential segregation
ordinance); Hull v. Eighty-Sixth Street Amusement Co., 144 N.Y.S. 318 (N.Y. App. Term
1913) (theatre tickets); Gibbs v. Arras Bros. 118 N.E. 857 (N.Y. 1918) (access to a liquor
saloon). The other cases varied. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (right
to vote); Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910) (murder defense); Afro-American
Order of Owls, Baltimore Nest No. I v. Talbot, 91 A. 570 (Md. 1914) (trademark action
involving name of the order); Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1915)
(showing the 'Birth of a Nation" lead to the revocation of a local theater's license; the
NAACP's involvement is not clear); State v. Bonner 168 S.W. 591 (Mo. 1914) (criminal
appeal).
10 See Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 102-04 (noting the several
industrialists and other wealthy patrons who financed the NAACP during these years).
II See generally id. (describing a number of other fledgling public interest groups around
at the birth of the NAACP); see also, e.g., In re Neuman, 155 N.Y.S. 428 (1915) (quoting the
advertisement of a lawyer that read "a white lawyer, who is a colored man's friend").
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bono was something done almost exclusively by elite lawyers.12 Indeed,
the binary definition of "public interest" adopted by the Supreme Court
reflects this history, as public interest work is partially defined as that
which is done without direct compensation.' 3 At the margin, elite law-
yers are more able to afford time to work for free. A lawyer's decision to
engage in a pro bono representation communicated to other lawyers and
clients his elite ranking. Today, most state bar rules strongly encourage
lawyers, regardless of status or experience, to engage in pro bono. 14 As a
result, lawyers can no longer advertise their elite status by accepting un-
paid, yet at times highly visible pro bono work. The overall decline in
the number of hours lawyers spend working on pro bono cases might
result from the democratization of pro bono practice. The problem with
pro bono might be that the self-interest component has disappeared.
1 2 See generally Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Forma-
tion and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI.
ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001).
13 Compare In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that solicitation of clients is
constitutionally protected for public interest legal practice not conducted for profit), and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (same), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that solicitation of clients is not constitutionally protected for private,
for-profit practices).
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002). In early 1993, the ABA House of
Delegates revised Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 to call upon all lawyers to "aspire" to
devoting 50 hours a year to pro bono public service of which a substantial majority shall go to
the poor and to organizations that help the poor. This rule had no direct counterpart in the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. EC 2-25 stated that the "basic responsibil-
ity for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual
lawyer." Florida nearly requires pro bono. Its rule is explicitly aspirational, but does mandate
annual reporting on fulfillment of the aspirational criteria. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR
R. 4-6.1 (2002).
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